Category: Flu Virus

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Phylogeography and reassortment patterns of human influenza A viruses in sub-Saharan Africa – Nature.com

August 18, 2024

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Phylogeography and reassortment patterns of human influenza A viruses in sub-Saharan Africa - Nature.com

How Your Cat or Dog Could Warn of a Bird Flu Outbreak – The New York Times

August 18, 2024

Trupanion, a Seattle-based pet insurance company, is partnering with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to create a disease tracking system for pets, the company announced this week. The system will draw on insurance claims submitted to Trupanion in real time when sick dogs and cats visit the veterinarian.

The concept is to proactively detect potential threats to pets and public health, said Dr. Steve Weinrauch, the chief veterinary and product officer at Trupanion.

The effort, which also includes academic scientists and other companies in the pet industry, is still in its early stages. Initially, it will focus on bird flu, a virus that has been spreading through American dairy cows and spilling over into domestic cats.

This is a really important public-private partnership that is going to help fill some important gaps, said Dr. Casey Barton Behravesh, who directs the C.D.C.s One Health Office, which focuses on the connections between human, animal and environmental health.

Its one of several ongoing efforts to address such gaps, which extend far beyond bird flu. Like most other countries, the United States has no comprehensive national system for tracking diseases in pets. While the C.D.C. is charged with protecting human health and the Department of Agriculture focuses on farm animals, companion animals tend to fall through the cracks.

This is a population that is a little bit lost in the shuffle, said Dr. Jennifer Granick, a veterinary internist at the University of Minnesota, who is one of the founders of a separate effort to create a disease surveillance system for pets.

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How Your Cat or Dog Could Warn of a Bird Flu Outbreak - The New York Times

Status of HPAIv – USGS (.gov)

August 18, 2024

Status of HPAIv

Understanding the timing and distribution of virus spread is critical for global commercial and wildlife biosecurity management. The current global HPAIv panzootic poses a serious threat to animals and public health, having affected approximately 600 bird and mammal species globally and over 83 million birds across North America as of December 2023. Of particular concern is the transmission of the virus to mammals, including the recent discovery of infections in dairy cattle in the U.S. and the detection of HPAIv in milk, posing a significant human health concern.

While previous studies linked bird migrations to avian flu outbreaks at poultry farms, only one earlier study by USGS authors predicted the virus could spread to cattle. It found wild waterfowl moving between natural wetlands and cattle facilities, likely attracted to supplemental water and food sources when natural resources dwindled along the Pacific Flyway.

The study combined extensive, long-term GPS tracking data from 16 species of wild waterfowl across North America with on-ground, county-level HPAIv surveillance data to understand the overlap of waterfowl and HPAIv detections. The researchers were also able to predict future outbreaks in counties and provincial areas through bird movements using a novel empirical SI (Susceptible-Infected) model, similar to the SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) model used to model COVID disease dynamics, via exposed migratory waterfowl.

The SI model projected exposure of up to 100% of birds via outbreak exposure in counties with HPAIv occurrence during spring migration, except for Pacific flyway birds, which were predicted to experience widespread arrival of HPAIv via birdbird exposure (up to 100%) during fall migration. The SI model accurately predicted HPAIv arrival in all flyways by migratory waterfowl, raptors, and other birds but was a lagging indicator for commercial facilities, Pelicans, and resident waterfowl/captive species in the Pacific flyway.

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Status of HPAIv - USGS (.gov)

6 domestic cats have tested positive for bird flu in Colorado so far this year – Denver 7 Colorado News

August 18, 2024

DENVER For months, avian influenza better known as bird flu has been detected in cattle and chickens across Colorado but it has now spread to at least six domestic cats, according to the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE).

One of those infected cats was "directly associated with a known infected commercial dairy facility," two other cases were "indoor only cats with no direct exposure to the virus," and the three remaining were known "indoor/outdoor cats that hunted mice and small birds, but also spent time inside with their owners," the CDPHE said.

At least three of the cats infected with bird flu were in Larimer County, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. A fourth cat case was found in Adams County and a fifth in Morgan County.

Denver7 has followed how the bird flu has developed around Colorado in recent months:

Dr. May Chu, epidemiologist at Colorado's School of Public Health, said the infected cats that spent time both outside and inside could have been infected by other animals.

"It's very likely that the cats who wander off or wander out may have caught a deer mouse or some kind of forage that they go through and they pick up something from an infected rodent," Dr. Chu said.

Dr. Gina Rodriguez, medical director at Evans East Animal Hospital, said symptoms look like a common cold.

"It can be as vague as lethargy, which is just kind of feeling under the weather," she said. "So, sneezing, eye discharge, nose discharge, coughing."

The six domestic cats were only diagnosed after they were tested for rabies first, explained Dr. Rachel Herlihy, state epidemiologist with the CDPHE.

"We know that rabies causes neurologic symptoms, and so that can include things like lack of coordination, inability to stand, tremors, or even seizures might occur in cats and so those are the same types of neurologic symptoms that can be seen in this H5N1 influenza infection," she said.

Dr. Rodriguez said she hasn't seen or heard of any cases in the Denver area, and both Dr. Herlihy and Dr. Chu told Denver7 these infections aren't something cat owners should panic about at the moment.

The cases are rare right now, Dr. Herlihy said, but added that cat owners should stay vigilant, especially for those who work or live near dairy farms.

There has been no transmission from infected cats to humans, she said.

"When we talk about risk to pets, we know that pets have very close contact with humans, so it's important to know that no human cases of this virus have been linked to exposure to infected cats, so we haven't seen cat-to-human transmission, so that's really important to know," she said. "But we do want people who may have contact with a cat that is suspected to have this infection to take the same precautions we are asking workers on farms to take, and so that's going to include things like PPE wearing masks, gloves, eye protection."

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6 domestic cats have tested positive for bird flu in Colorado so far this year - Denver 7 Colorado News

CDC pandemic review of US H5N1 virus on par with earlier assessments from same clade – University of Minnesota Twin Cities

August 18, 2024

The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) late last week published its assessment of the H5N1 avian influenza virus that infected a dairy worker in Texas, putting its risk to the general public as low and its risk as a potential pandemic virus as moderate, similar to that posed by two other recent 2.3.4.4b clade viruses.

Health officials had announced in May that the CDC had started the detailed process of conducting a pandemic risk assessment using its Influenza Risk Assessment Tool (IRAT). With IRAT, CDC scientists' goals are answering two risk assessment questions, one on emergence and the other on public health impact. Health officials use IRAT to gauge the pandemic potential of flu viruses and to guide preparedness measures.

The CDC has published two previous assessments for viruses from the 2.3.4.4b clade, one in July 2023 for the H5N1 virus that triggered an outbreak at a Spanish mink farm and the other in March 2022 fora sample from a wigeon duck collected in South Carolina in 2021 when the virus first began circulating in US wild birds.

Like the other two recent 2.3.4.4b viruses, the subtype that infected the Texas patient is in the moderate risk for both future emergence and public health impact.

CDC experts submitted the scores for the virus from the Texas patient on June 26, which include information from other US cases but not the most recent ones reported in Colorado poultry workers.

The CDC said the Texas virus scored slightly higher on some risk elements, but lower on others compared to other recent 2.3.4.4b strains. The newer virus had a public health impact score similar to the Spanish mink farm virus, but it had a higher emergence score than the other two viruses.

"However, the mean-high and mean-low acceptable score ranges for these viruses overlap, indicating that these viruses remain similar, and their overall risk scores remain 'moderate,' " the group said.

Compared to 15 other viruses on the CDC's IRAT list, the Texas virus has the sixth-highest emergence score and the seventh-highest public impact score.

In other H5N1 developments, the Colorado Veterinary Medical Association recently warned animal health providers about potential infections in cats, even if all the risk factors or clinical signs aren't present.

Of six H5N1 confirmations in Colorado cats so far, only one was directly linked to a dairy farm. Three were indoor cats that had access to the outdoors and could have hunted mice or birds, and two were exclusively indoor cats.

Five had similar symptoms, which started with lethargy and poor appetite and progressed to respiratory and neurologic symptoms. Several were tested for rabies, owing to a similar clinical picture.

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CDC pandemic review of US H5N1 virus on par with earlier assessments from same clade - University of Minnesota Twin Cities

Avian flu alert: Understanding the circulating influenza virus H5N1’s threat – Observer Research Foundation

August 18, 2024

For a little over three years now, scientists have been tracking a genetically distinctinfluenza virus, originally affecting birds (avian influenza) and mammals in the Americas (Figure 1), that is now causing a widespread outbreak in cattle across the United States (US). Reports of 13 human cases from close contact with dairy animals in the US have cast a spotlight on the evolving nature and zoonotic potential of avian influenza viruses. These reports have also raised an alert in organisations working on pandemic preparedness across the world, advocating close monitoring and assessment of current threat levels. While the current avian influenza outbreak in the US poses a low public health threat due to limited human-to-human transmission, we should be attentive to the potential of this zoonotic virus to cause significant disruptions.

A salient feature that puts this family of influenza viruses in the pandemic watchlist is their ability to cross-species boundaries and mix up their genomes, while continuing to accumulate mutations. These changes can result in viruses that are so different from the circulating/past influenza viruses that previous exposures or vaccinations may no longer work, or the virus may even be able to infect a completely new host with no existing immunity to this virusresulting in outbreaks and the threat of a pandemic.

Figure 1: Avian Influenza detected in mammalian species across the world

Source: WOAH

Since early 2022, numerous mammalian species around the world have succumbed to avian influenza, caused by the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 sub-type of Influenza A viruses. While the primary targets/hosts of HPAI H5N1 (one of the types of the avian influenza virus) are birds, massive deaths of elephant seals and sea lions as a result of an H5N1 outbreak were reported from South America in 2023. As the virus continues to mutate and adapt, monitoring these cross-species transmissions becomes ever more critical.

Figure 2: Countries that reported human Avian Flu H5N1 cases to WHO between 2022-2024

Source: WHO andCDC

The transmission of the H5N1 virus to humans is rare (Figure 2), typically requiring close contact with infected birds or animals and their secretions. In the 2024 outbreak of bovine HPAI H5N1 affecting 171 cattle herds across 13 states in the USA only 13 cases have been confirmed, and there has been continuous monitoring of people who have interacted closely with animals. The detection of the virus in unpasteurised/raw milk has added another layer of complexity. Although this might sound alarmingheat inactivates the virus in milk, making pasteurisation an effective safeguard.

Another intriguing feature of the bovine HPAI H5N1 outbreak in the USA is its genetic distinctiveness. The virus strain causing the outbreak in the Americas belongs to clade 2.3.4.4b, setting it apart from its Southeast Asian counterparts. The expansion of this strain likely began with a single introduction from an infected bird in late 2023 or early 2024. This genetic insight has real-world implications for tracking and controlling outbreaks.

Genetic sequencing of viruses from the human cases of bovine HPAI H5N1 would help address these questions.

Since the range of animals that can be infected by a virus depends on whether or not they have the right binding partner for the virus, changes in what a virus binds to are important to monitor for understanding receptor affinity. A study published in July 2024 found that a HPAI H5N1 virus isolated from a cow from the US 2024 cattle outbreak, was able to bind to the sialic acids expressed in the human upper respiratory tract. If this change is seen frequently it could have implications for human infections. It is also important to monitor the genomes of bovine HPAI H5N1 viruses for emergence and expansion of other mutations that facilitate replication and transmission in mammals. Genetic sequencing of viruses from the human cases of bovine HPAI H5N1 would help address these questions.

From a preparedness standpoint, many countries do have stock-piles of the H5N1 vaccine. A study published in July 2024 confirmed that these vaccines, derived from earlier strains of HPAI H5N1, generated cross-neutralising antibodies against the circulating H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses, with seroconversion rates of 60-95 percent in vaccinated individuals after 2 or 3 doses of the vaccines. This suggests that these stockpiled vaccines could serve as bridging vaccines until updated H5N1 vaccines become available. Not all countries have a national stockpile nor is the global capacity currently sufficient for scaling emergency vaccine production and equitable distribution. As part of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework, the WHO has launched an initiative to advance mRNA vaccine development against human avian influenza. Additionally, Oseltamivir (brand name Tamiflu) which has been used in the treatment of human influenza viruses, is currently being recommended for both the treatment and post-exposure prophylaxis of HPAI H5N1 in the US.

The limited availability of genetic data from these outbreaks hampers our ability to understand the local circulation of the virus and monitor its evolution.

Globally, avian influenza outbreaks in birds are a regular occurrence. In India several states, including Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Kerala, and Jharkhand, are grappling with ongoing outbreaks in birds. While there have been no human cases of H5N1 reported in India, a case, of H9N2 was recently confirmed in West Bengal. The limited availability of genetic data from these outbreaks hampers our ability to understand the local circulation of the virus and monitor its evolution. This gap in data means that we do not know if the avian influenza H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b is present in India nor do we have adequate genomic surveillance in place to monitor introduction and spread.

On the other hand, India is a long-standing contributor to WHO's Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), with National Institute of Virology recognised as a WHO National Influenza Centre (NIC) since 1980. India also has at least three (as of 2019) manufacturers of influenza vaccines and multiple companies that produce generic versions of Tamiflu.

A key gap for a public health response is going to be the absence of timely surveillance data signalling a local outbreak. This is primarily due to two reasons, one being the non-availability of H5N1 diagnostic kit and the other being delays in genomic sequencing. India does have an Action Plan for Prevention, Control and Containment of Avian Influenza (2021) with a focus on animals. Towards the end of 2023, the WHO organised a regional workshop on Preparedness and Resilience for Emerging Threats (PRET) Initiative. Subsequently India initiated the development of a National Preparedness Plan for Respiratory Viruses in alignment with WHO-PRET. If the technical packages and proposed networks assist with simulations and drills for testing the system, it could prove to be an invaluable framework helping the country address gaps in preparedness.

India does have an Action Plan for Prevention, Control and Containment of Avian Influenza (2021) with a focus on animals.

Indias pandemic threat level from bovine HPAI H5N1 does seem low from the available data. However, India has one of the largest livestock populations in the world. Consequently, the situation across the world does warrant a call for an integrated effort with transparent data sharing among stakeholders both in animal health and public health. Multiple initiatives such as the One Health framework being formed in are key in developing tools and strategies for early detection of an outbreak, preventive measures and an outbreak response that spans/considers multiple species.

Chitra Pattabiraman is a virologist/molecular biologist who consults with multiple organizations on projects related to infectious disease, diagnostics, emerging infections, environmental surveillance, animal health and public health in India.

Siva Athreya is a Professor at the International Centre for Theoretical Sciences-TIFR.

Originally posted here:

Avian flu alert: Understanding the circulating influenza virus H5N1's threat - Observer Research Foundation

Sitting ducks: how likely is a bird flu pandemic in India? – Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance

August 18, 2024

Every year, millions of migratory birds soar across continents, to seek the warmth of Indias wetlands and forests. Wardens of healthy ecosystems, migratory birds are also contributors to the global spread and evolution of avian influenza, or bird flu.

Wild aquatic birds are the primary and natural reservoirs for avian influenza A viruses (AIV). Most of these viruses exhibit low pathogenicity, causing only mild or asymptomatic infections.

Over time, however, the carriage and exchange of different virus strains along migration routes, transmission to domestic poultry, and reassortment that is, the mixing of different genetic material into new combinations of viruses between wild birds and poultry has led to the emergence of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses with the ability to cause severe and highly contagious disease. Some of these can be fatal.

Once largely confined to birds, HPAI viruses have evolved into different clades, some causing mass epizootic think epidemic, but among animals outbreaks, and sporadic spillover human infections.

Characterised and named according to the combination pattern of two surface proteins, hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA), the AIV subtypes, H5, H7 and H9 have, in particular, proven their zoonotic capability by crossing species and infecting mammals.

Currently dominating world news for its infection of cattle herds in the US the first avian influenza spillover to cattle on record the HPAI A(H5N1) virus was first identified in farmed waterfowl in 1996 in China. After nearly a 30-year haul of reassortments and mutations, over 800 human infections in 23 countries with >50% mortality (most cases from 20032019), large and lethal infections in wild and farmed birds across continents (since 2020), and diverse spillover to over 40 species of mammals, the current 2.3.3.4b clade of HPAI A(H5N1) is still short of the adaptation or adaptations it needs to be capable of causing a human pandemic.

There is no evidence yet of sustained human-to-human transmission of HPAI A(H5N1). Thats reassuring but considering the geographical reach, the species promiscuity, and the notorious ability of AIV to reassert and revolve, it has to be said that this might change.

Since 2006, when Indias first avian influenza outbreak was reported in Navapur, Maharashtra in a poultry farm, the country has reported outbreaks in poultry every year in various states, leading to the culling of over 9 million birds, resulting in substantial economic losses.

As reported in a 2023 article in the Indian Journal of Medical Research, between 2006 and 2021, the largest number of HPAI (H5N1 and H5N8) virus outbreaks were reported from Maharashtra, West Bengal, Kerala and Odisha, with over 25 outbreaks in each state. Most recently, as avian influenza continued to spread globally, four Indian states Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Jharkhand and Kerala recorded cases of avian influenza in poultry in May and June of this year.

With wild bird-poultry interface aplenty in its wetlands on central migratory flyways, and with a massive poultry sector that ranks third in the world for egg production, how much at risk is India for an avian influenza pandemic in humans?

The threat for India will be no different from the rest of the world, and that is unpredictable until we actually have sustained transmission and a large number of (human) cases, says Gagandeep Kang, noted Indian virologist.

Only two human cases of avian influenza have been reported in India thus far, the most recent one being in a four-year-old-child infected with avian influenza A(H9N2) in West Bengal in May 2024. That child was reported to have made a full recovery. In July 2021, the first case of a fatal avian HPAI A(H5N1) infection occurred in a boy under 18 years of age in Haryana. The source of infection was not ascertainable in either case, although both cases had family-owned poultry or butchery businesses.

Two is too small a sample size to scrutinise for epidemic or pandemic potential, says Gautam Menon, Professor of Physics and Biology atAshokaUniversity with expertise in epidemiological modelling of infectious diseases. There are too few cases for us to understand how the disease might affect people. Once there is evidence for a [novel] virus that moves easily between people, that could potentially lead to severe disease one can then bring in modelling to evaluate its pandemic potential. This is information that can only come once we begin to see a number of cases and even then, it may take time for us to fully understand its long-term impact, he explains, adding that tracking outbreaks and using genomic surveillance to identify whether a human infection has come from birds is essential.

With much of the global focus being on avian HPAI A(H5N1), the recent avian influenza A(H9N2) case in India has elicited relatively less concern. As Kang explains, H9N2 cases in humans are rare, with about 100 reported until recently. They do not result in mortality at the same rate as other AIV strains, but with any influenza virus, the concerns about transmission and virulence apply, and surveillance needs to be in place to detect potential changes in virus behaviour as early as possible. H9N2 is a low-pathogenicity AIV, but its severity in birds, where it causes about 10% mortality, does not predict how it will behave in humans now or in the future.

This unpredictability may apply to HPAI A(H5N1) as well, albeit conversely. Shahid Jameel, Indian virologist and Research Fellow at University of Oxford, explains, Transmission of avian flu viruses to humans is very inefficient due to the biology of these viruses and the types of cells that line the human upper and lower respiratory pathways. Human-to-human transmission of H5 viruses is even rarer. Whether an H5 virus that transmits more easily to and between humans will retain the cumulative human mortality rate of 4050% is not known. Most likely it will reduce in virulence but its anyones guess.

The measured case fatality rate of around 50% in humans infected with avian HPAI A(H5N1) is likely to be an over-estimate because milder cases may not be seen in the health care system, Kang clarifies. The real concern, Jameel stresses, is H5 AIV crossing the avian-to-mammalian species barrier and showing up in cattle, as in the US, which would have the potential to significantly speed up virus evolution. The potential for human transmission is getting more real, he cautions. Recent epidemiologic and genomic evidence revealing efficient cow-to-cow transmission in the US underscores the potential of avian HPAI A(H5N1) for adaptation and efficient transmission between humans.

Caution, vigilance, and surveillance remain key in the face of uncertainty. As Menon notes, Adequate sentinel surveillance, alertness to clusters of cases in birds and reports of mass bird deaths, the willingness to cull infected animals at scale, are key mitigating measures.

Noting Indias backyard poultry sector, which is seen as a challenge for surveillance, Kang opines, surveillance does not mean being in every backyard poultry farm to examine every transmission event this is impossible. One Health surveillance does mean being ready to detect a signal when it gets to a level of public health significance any cluster of human cases, any major illnesses or die-off of birds or animals, we should be able to investigate quickly.

Alertness and early detection were key lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic that brought with it a strengthening of health systems and lessons in pandemic preparedness. Sequencing was strengthened during COVID. Deploy it aggressively for field epidemiology and case characterisation, Jameel urges.

Early detection matters, so maintaining (not setting up and dismantling) surveillance is going to be critical for our preparedness, not just for bird flu but also for pandemic influenza preparedness, which may come from mutating known human strains as well as the emergence of new strains or reassortants, Kang observes.

Previously deployed successfully for COVID-19, wastewater surveillance can aid in the early detection of pathogens, offering crucial lead time for decision-making and preventive measures before human cases occur.

In a brainstorming session that the Department of Animal Husbandry & Dairying held last month, special emphasis was placed on developing SOPs for environmental surveillance using low-cost methods at sites like wet markets, water bodies, wastewater, slaughterhouses and poultry farms.

The session brought together different health ministries and departments to enhance surveillance, response mechanisms and vaccine development by leveraging the One Health approach. What matters is action on the ground, Jameel remarks, reflecting on the session, and adds that a clear chain of command integrating Indias various health departments for One Health will be vital as will sharing data widely across institutions.

As economies, particularly of low-income and middle-income countries, continue to recover from COVID-19, the notion of another pandemic is wearisome, to say the least. Communicating to the public that a bird flu pandemic is a possible but deeply uncertain prospect is a responsibility that health authorities must shoulder.At the time this article went to press, WHO had not updated its advice for India from June 2024 that read With the currently available evidence, WHO assesses the current public health risk to the general population posed by this virus as low.

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Sitting ducks: how likely is a bird flu pandemic in India? - Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance

The World Is Not Ready for the Next Pandemic – Foreign Affairs Magazine

August 18, 2024

Less than five years after the outbreak of COVID-19, the world remains vulnerable to another pandemic. Over the past five months, a mutated strain of the H5N1 influenza virus detected in dairy cattle poses a potential risk for a pandemic-causing virus. Yet governments and international organizations have done far too little to prepare for such a scenario, despite the lessons they should have learned from the global battle with COVID-19.

After the COVID-19 crisis revealed the shortcomings of the global public health response system, many assumed that governments and international organizations would strive to fix the most obvious problems. Given the catastrophic human and economic costs of the pandemic, countries had a strong incentive to start spending heavily on developing new generations of more protective influenza and coronavirus vaccines, as well as to greatly expand global manufacturing and distribution networks. But this has not happened. At current funding levels, it will likely take a decade or longer to develop more effective and longer-lasting vaccines. Although there are groups at work on new treatments and other antiviral initiatives, on the whole, global society does not appear to be much more prepared for a future coronavirus or influenza pandemic than it was five years ago.

The resurgence of H5N1 influenza in humans and animals has highlighted these failures. Although the virus was identified in the 1990s, over the last 20 years it has continued to mutate, reinventing itself over and over again. Today, it is infecting millions of birds, but it has also become more capable of spilling over into at least 40 species of mammals. It still cannot easily transmit between humans, but infections in dairy cattle, which have influenza receptors for both avian and human influenza viruses in their udders, demonstrate the risk for a new pandemic.

It is impossible to know when a new pandemic will arise, or which specific pathogen will be its cause. H5N1 is just one of the viruses that could mutate into something that will start a pandemic. But eventually, one will happen. It is therefore time to move away from vague recommendations and best practices to a far larger-scale program aimed at producing new and better vaccines, antiviral drugs and other countermeasures, and building the infrastructure at the scale needed to protect entire populations. Although such efforts will be costly, failing to take these steps could be catastrophic.

Although it has never caused a human pandemic, the H5N1 virus has been on the public health radar for decades. It was first identified in late 1996, when a new influenza virus, initially known as high pathogenic avian H5N1, began circulating in avian species in Asia. Influenza strains are classified by the characteristics of two proteins, hemagglutinin and neuraminidase, on the virion particles surface. The pathogen gained international attention for causing a 1997 outbreak in Hong Kong, killing six of the 18 people infected. To control the spread, Hong Kong was forced to cull millions of poultry from its markets and from the supplying farms.

In December 2003, H5N1 reemerged. For the next three years, wild birds spread the virus to domestic waterfowl and chickens in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. It also infected a limited number of mammals, including tigers in Thai zoos, and eventually made its way to 148 humans in five Asian countries. Seventy-nine of those cases53 percentproved fatal. As the virus spread, public health officials grew concerned that the world was on the brink of a devastating pandemic. In 2005, at the height of that scare, one of us (Osterholm) wrote a Foreign Affairs article explaining how governments should prepare for such a scenario. The essay noted that the World Health Organizations (WHO) and various countries pandemic response plans were vague and did not offer a realistic blueprint for how to get a population through a potential one-to-three-year pandemic. The article recommended an initiative to provide vaccines for the entire world, with a well-defined schedule to ensure that it would be carried out in a timely way.

Fortunately, H5N1 did not cause a pandemic in 2005. But in late 2019, a different virus did. COVID-19 was a novel coronavirusso called because of the protein spikes on the virion surface that give it a corona-like appearancethat began infecting thousands of people in Wuhan, China. Soon, it spread across China, then the continent, and then the world. In its first year, COVID-19 infected hundreds of millions of people and killed at least three million.

Influenza pandemics are not a new phenomenon. From 2009 to 2010, an H1N1 viruspopularly known as swine flurapidly spread around the planet, killing an estimated 575,000 people. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimated that 60.8 million people were infected, 273,300 hospitalized, and 12,469 died. This level of morbidity and mortality was tragic, but for a flu pandemic, relatively mild. After all, the 1918 flu pandemic, also H1N1, killed between 50 million and 100 million people worldwide, or at least 2.7 percent of the worlds population.

It might be tempting to conclude that the 2009 pandemic was less deadly than its 1918 counterpart because of 90 years of intervening medical progress, including improved vaccines. Unfortunately, that conclusion is incorrect. The 2009 virus was simply less virulent than the one that spread in 1918. Moreover, the most vulnerable grouppeople over 65already had H1N1 antibodies, thanks to previous infections with related viruses. As COVID-19 showed, the world is no better prepared for pandemics today than it was a century ago and, in some ways, is worse off. Today, there are three times as many people as in 1918. Hundreds of millions live close to poultry and pigs. Air travel can transport infected carriers anywhere in the world within hours. (There are more than a billion international border crossings annually.) And global supply chains have created far greater international interdependence. Humanity, in other words, has become an extraordinarily efficient biological mixing bowl as well as a highly productive viral mutation factory.

That does not mean an H5N1 pandemic is about to unfold. Both the WHO and the CDC assess the current risk of H5N1 in humans to be low. So far, there is no compelling evidence that the current virus is becoming better at attaching to the receptor sites for influenza in the human respiratory tract, the critical bar H5N1 must clear before it can cause a pandemic. To date, the primary outcome of humans becoming infected with H5N1 in the United Stateswhether by association with infected poultry flocks or working with infected dairy cowsis conjunctivitis. This is unsurprising since humans have receptor sites in the eye for bird viruses.

But nature can change fast. Viruses are constantly mutating and reassorting. Influenza reassortment can occur when a human, pig, or cow becomes infected simultaneously with two different viruses, presenting the opportunity for the pathogens to swap critical genetic segments and create new strains. Although the vast majority of these alterations either have little significance or make the new form less robust and adaptable, occasionally a mutation or reassortment will make a virus more transmissible, dangerous, or both. H5N1 could experience such a transformation at any point, turning the current consensus on its head. And H5N1 is just one of the influenza strains the epidemiology community is closely monitoring.

Officials should make no mistake: there will be more influenza and coronavirus pandemics, and any one of them could prove far more catastrophic than the COVID-19 pandemic. Whenever it occurs, it will almost certainly be a virus, primarily transmitted from person to person via the airborne route, a virus with wings, meaning the viral particles can be suspended in the air for long periods and distances. When such an outbreak transpires, rapid global transmission will happen before anyone realizes the world is in the earliest days of a years-long pandemic. Governments cannot wait to prepare until a virus is already spreading around the world. As the last five years have shown, even a moderately deadly disease can have enormous health, economic, social, and political consequences.

It is time for all nations to wake up to the danger and prepare for a new pandemic. At the top of the list should be a game-changing improvement in the medical countermeasures that governments put in place to fight influenza viruses and coronaviruses. Specifically, this means vaccines, drug treatments, and diagnostic tests. Improving the design and systems for manufacturing personal protective equipment quickly and in sufficient numbers will also be essential. Governments must begin investing heavily in vaccine research and development, including studies aimed at creating universal influenza and coronavirus vaccines: ones that provide protection against multiple strains of either virus, offer durable protection for extended periods, and can be manufactured quickly and distributed globally.

To be fully effective, improved vaccines must be safe and provide multiyear protection against most possible influenza strains. They must significantly reduce the likelihood of serious illness, hospitalization, and death, as well as prevent infection and transmission. Ideally, they should be produced and routinely administered to the general population before a pandemic virus emerges, and be readily available in low- and middle-income countries. Researchers are still a long way from creating such a vaccine, though current developments in the lab suggest it is possible. But at the current level of support for research and development, it could take a decade or more to achieve these game-changing vaccines. With significantly greater government support, this timeline almost certainly could be shortened.

The price tag for such measures will be high, and not all of the investment will pay dividends. But a new pandemic could prove far more deadly or costly than a new war, and governments rarely shy away from spending whatever is deemed necessary on new and better weapons. Biological security is just as important as military security, and the United States needs to accept the idea that it would be going to war against a microbial enemy potentially far more dangerous than any conceivable human foe.

Until these universal or near-universal vaccines are created, policymakers will need to work with currently available influenza and COVID-19 vaccines. These shots are good, but hardly great. For example, they limited illness and deaths caused by the 200910 H1N1 influenza and the COVID-19 pandemics, but the protection they provide against infection varies widely. Even now, the effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccines against symptomatic illness, disease severity, and hospitalization is largely determined by the viral variant then circulating and whether the infected person is immunocompromised. Similarly, the effectiveness of influenza vaccines against illness requiring medical care ranges from less than 20 percent to as high as 60 percent for any given flu season.

COVID-19 and flu vaccines also lack durability. In one recent study, the CDC found that COVID-19 inoculations provided approximately 54 percent protection against the need for medical care at an average of 52 days after vaccination. According to a different study, the vaccine loses almost all of its protective powers after a year. Current flu vaccine protection is even shorter, beginning to wane after only a month or two.

To keep up, health authorities generally recommend booster vaccines every year for influenza and even more often for COVID-19, with the antigenic component changing to match the most recent circulating strain. But when a reassorted or mutated virus with pandemic potential emerges, it is likely to be significantly different, causing vaccines to miss their targets. That, in part, was why H1N1 was able to spark a pandemic in 2009. The United States has tried to get out ahead of H5N1 by stockpiling 4.8 million vaccine doses, which were recently tested and found to be potentially effective against H5N1 by the Food and Drug Administration. But if a new H5N1 variant were to cause a pandemic, the changes to the viruss makeup could render the present vaccines largely or entirely ineffective.

Even if the vaccine in the current stockpile does prove effective, there are not enough doses to control an emerging H5N1 pandemic. The United States is home to 333 million people, each of whom would need two shots to be fully immunized, meaning the 4.8 million doses on hand would cover only about 0.7 percent of the population. The government would, of course, try to scale up production quickly, but doing so would be tricky. During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the first lot of vaccine was released on October 1, almost six months after the pandemic was declared. Only 11.2 million doses were available before peak incidence.

Other countries are no better equipped. In a 2019 report, the WHO and three academic centers estimated annual worldwide seasonal influenza vaccine production capacity to be 1.48 billion doses, with potential production capacity to be 4.15 billion doses. That means a maximum of two billion people25 percent of global populationcould be vaccinated in the first year of a pandemic.

The WHOs estimates rely on some optimistic assumptions. In the event of a pandemic, for example, the research assumes that there would be an adequate supply of egg-laying chickens, since fertilized chicken eggs are the vessels in which most influenza vaccines are grown. But since the natural reservoir for all influenza strains is avian, the virus could kill off or otherwise compromise large numbers of chickens. Even if it didnt, an H5N1 pandemic might erupt when manufacturers are in the middle of their normal, seasonal vaccine production, making it hard for them to rapidly switch. And a pandemic influenza vaccine strain may not grow as well in eggs and cells as do seasonal virus vaccines.

The 2019 WHO study also identified several potential bottlenecks. Manufacturers may not have sufficient facilities to put their vaccine into vials or syringes, and there may not be a sufficient and timely supply of those vials and syringes, or of reagentsthe chemicals to produce the vaccines. Shipping and administration of shots will be a significant challenge in many low- and middle-income countries. Manufacturers could lack the workforce protection needed to ensure continuous production. And producers may be short on adjuvants, compounds that enhance immune responses. Without them, twice as much antigen would be needed per dose.

Public health experts and government health officials are aware of the threat of another pandemic and have launched a variety of initiatives to mitigate it. The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovationsfocused on developing vaccines and treatments for infectious diseaseshas outlined a plan for delivering pandemic-beating vaccines within 100 days of a WHO declaration. CEPI has laid out five areas of innovation needed to make this a reality: creating a library of prototype vaccines for pathogens across multiple virus families, having clinical trials networks at the ready, speeding up identification of immune response markers, building global vaccine manufacturing capacity, and strengthening disease surveillance and global early-warning systems. These innovations, if realized, would greatly improve the worlds pandemic readiness. But with current funding levels, the projects 100-day target is hugely ambitious and unlikely to be realized over the next decade for either influenzas or coronaviruses. And as public health experts and governments rightly focus on shortening the time from the beginning of the pandemic until the first vaccine doses are available, just as important is how long it takes until everyone is vaccinated.

Nonetheless, some important steps forward have been made since the 2019 report. Improvements in mRNA technology, first used to make the most successful COVID-19 vaccines, could help speed up influenza vaccine production. Three Phase 3 trials are underway to evaluate the effectiveness of mRNA influenza vaccines. But no such vaccines are yet ready, and it is unclear when they will be.

In response to all these shortcomings, beginning in 2019, the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota, which one of us (Osterholm) directs, has led an effort to coordinate research and development of new seasonal and universal influenza vaccines. Using a team of 147 multidisciplinary experts, CIDRAP launched the Influenza Vaccines Research and Development Roadmap to advance the scientific and policy knowledge needed to produce better vaccines and track progress. So far, the initiative has identified more than 420 projects that address at least one of these strategic goals, totaling over $1.4 billion, with U.S. government agencies funding approximately 85 percent of these research studies. This is a start toward more effective vaccines, but only a start. Recently, the Department of Health and Human Services Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) provided $176 million to Moderna to develop an mRNA-based pandemic influenza vaccine aimed at multiple strains of the virus. This effort should improve the speed with which a vaccine can be made available in an emerging influenza pandemic, but it is not expected to improve on the effectiveness of the current generation of mRNA vaccines.

BARDA has recently launched an initiative to develop better coronavirus vaccines and antiviral drugs, called Project NextGen. While it is to be hoped that this effort leads to better and quicker results, the $5 billion government investmenta tiny fraction of what the United States devotes to weapon systems procurementis only a minimal down payment on the research and development needed to accomplish this important goal. There is nothing currently in the legislative pipeline to suggest that Project NextGen will continue receiving vital government support.

Given these shortfalls, it will likely be a long time before scientists develop game-changing vaccines. In the interim, governments will have to dramatically increase the capacity to produce at pandemic scale the vaccines the world already has. This will mean high-income nations subsidizing their own pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity and helping middle- and low-income countries establish facilities and train workers to staff them.

At first glance, the costs may seem prohibitively high. But consider the stakes. If H5N1, or any other airborne virus that begins to spread in the human population, sparks a pandemic with a fatality rate even three to five percent higher than COVID, the world will be going to war against a terrifying microbial enemy. It would be far more deadly than any pandemic in living memory or any military conflict since World War II. Viewed from that perspective, adopting a military model of planning, procurement, and development is not just rational but essential. Yes, some of the pandemic preparedness projects the government funds may not pan out. Others may never go into use. But governments, and the people who vote them into power, have long accepted that aircraft carriers, fighter jets, and other weapons systems come with enormous price tags and take many years to finance, design, build, test, and commission. And they also accept that some of these arms may sit in storage until they are obsolete. Nations invest anyway, because in war, such weapons become indispensable. It is urgent that governments begin to think the same way about pandemic preparedness.

Of course, it is still possible that such a pandemic may never ariseor that it doesnt occur for many years. But hope is not a strategy. The United States and the rest of the high- and middle-income world need to start devoting the necessary resources to developing better vaccines, treatments, and other countermeasures immediately. Humanity will not get ahead of a pandemic-causing virus without such commitment.

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The World Is Not Ready for the Next Pandemic - Foreign Affairs Magazine

Several domestic cats in Colorado have tested positive for bird flu – Food Safety News

August 18, 2024

It was likely to upset their core audience, but Colorado Public Radio nonetheless reported that H5N1 avian flu is showing up in the states domestic house cats. Its news that originated on the Colorado Veterinary Medical Associations website.

It stems from six feline Highly Pathogenic Avian Flu cases, including only one outside Northern Colorado. That area has been hard hit with poultry and cattle outbreaks of the bird flu.

The USDA has reported that five of the six feline cases have occurred in the northern counties of Adams, Larimer, and Morgan.

There have also been cases of bird flu in domestic cats in Texas.

Since 2022, the avian flu virus has been detected in numerous Colorado mammals, including red fox, mountain lion, bobcat, and black bear, as well as deer mouse, house mouse, dessert cottontail, prairie vole, raccoon and striped skunk.

According to Colorado officials, no human bird flu cases are linked to exposure to infected house cats, and the risk of H5N1 to the general public remains low.

The infected Colorado cats include two indoor-only pets and three indoor-outdoor cats known to hunt for mice or small birds outdoors. Mice testing positive for H5N1 is fairly common in Colorado.

Since 2022,the U.S. has reported 14 human cases of Avian flu in three states. Four were linked to exposure to dairy cows, occurring since March. Ten had exposure to poultry, reported between April 28, 2022, and July 25 this year2024.

Since the current round of bird flu began in early 2022, more than 100 million birds from commercial flocks have been lost in 48 states. Since March, the number of infected dairy herds has reached 190 in 13 states, with 63 infected herds in Colorado.

The CDCs flu surveillance systems report no indicators of unusual influenza activity in people, including avian influenza A(H5).

Still, the CDC wants to be prepared. It has 4.8 million doses of a possible vaccine ready for distribution. It intends to stop infections if necessary.

So far, that hasnt been necessary. The few human cases have not been severe. It is not yet known to be spreading person-to-person. An antiviral remains a better treatment than a vaccine.

(To sign up for a free subscription to Food Safety News,click here.)

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Several domestic cats in Colorado have tested positive for bird flu - Food Safety News

How is bird flu affecting animal populations? – Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance

August 18, 2024

Brown skuas and south polar skuas, two gull-like species that nest in Antarctica, are sometimes called the pirates of the Southern seas. These migratory seabirds are fierce, competitive predators that hunt or scavenge anything, from eggs and adult birds to seafood, mammals or garbage.

Theyre really tough animals and theyre dying, says Antonio Quesada, director of the Spanish Polar Committee.

He gravely recounts why this seasons field work in the Antarctic was like no other: A lethal strain of avian flu, H5N1,breached this fragile ecosystemin February. Only a handful of specially trained researchers were allowed onshore in outbreak sites, garbed in hazmat suits to prevent contagion and spread.

The true scale of the event is still unknown, but reports were grim. In the Falkland Islands, H5N1killed 10,000 black-browed albatrossand ravageda gentoo penguin colony. Scientists discovered a mass skua die-off:50 carcasses littered a Beak Island nesting colony of 130.

Quesada has rarely seen a single dead skua in 20 years work in Antarctica. Theyre an indicator species. If theyre dying, what does it mean for other birds? he asks.

The threat posed by H5N1 extends far beyond the frozen South. Few people realize that the world is currently gripped in another serious pandemic or, to be exact,apanzootic, the animal equivalent. This virus has now infected more than 500 bird and mammal species.

Since it emerged in 2020 in Europe, this Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) strain has blazed a trail of death across the planet, the largest outbreak in history. The virus is both lethal and unusually transmissible, jumping between birds, mammals and livestock with frightening agility.

Experts say the threat to humans is rising. Manycountries are increasing surveillance and developing or buying vaccines. Cases areticking up in the U.S.: Four people contracted the virus from cows and 10 others caught it from chickens.

Meanwhile, it continues to devastate wildlife, including many endangered animals, saysChris Walzer, executive director of health at the nonprofit Wildlife Conservation Society. As of March, H5N1 had leapt the species barrier to infectsome 485 types of birdandat least 48 mammal species, according to United Nations estimates. Many of these species had never been diagnosed with avian influenza before.

The disease has infiltrated even the most remote regions on six continents. When a polar bear in Alaska succumbed in 2023, it marked the first detected mammal death from avian flu in the Arctic. Thus far, only Australia and the Pacific Islands have been spared. And the virus is still on the move, spreading to new hosts as it evolves and picks up genes from other bird flu strains.

Victims have died in staggering numbers, especially animals that congregate in large groups like pinnipeds. The virus swept along South Americas Atlantic and Pacific coastlines,slaying more than 30,000 sea lionsin 2022-23. It then killed some17,000 Southern elephant seal pups on Argentinas Pennsula Valds the species largest die-off ever.

H5N1 has been carried worldwide by migrating birds. Butnew researchshows that this current strain (dubbed clade 2.3.4.4b) can now spread directly between mammals, with frightening implications. It seems that H5N1 viruses are becoming more evolutionarily flexible and adapting to mammals in new ways, the studys authors write, which could have global consequences for wildlife, humans, and/or livestock.

Walzer warns, H5N1 now presents an existential threat to the worlds biodiversity.

Its important to understand that this panzootic is a man-made problem, says Vincent Munster, who heads the Virus Ecology Section at the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.

Avian flu is not uncommon in wild birds, particularly in its natural hosts:ducks, geese, gulls, terns, swansand other waterfowl. They carry a low pathogenic form, a mild virus that may be asymptomatic. It spreads seasonally, when multiple species congregate at migration stopover sites or cluster together to nest.

But when avian flu spills over into poultry, it can morph into a highly contagious, fatal virus.

The current panzootic began when this H5N1 strain jumped from domestic poultry back into wild birds which happened because of modern livestock production methods. Humans further facilitated spillover by destroying wetlands, which crowds migrating birds into small scraps of habitat, often with poultry farms nearby.

When farms encroach wetlands, it creates the perfect interface for this type of virus, Walzer says. Its a veritable petri dish of opportunity for avian flu to swap genes and mutate into potentially more virulent or transmissible strains. This environment allowed the virus to infect chickens, geese and ducks and jump back into the wild in a virulent form.

The emergence of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza is a direct result of commercial, large-scale poultry farming, Munster says. There are more than 34 billion chickens on Earth, according to Food and Agriculture Organization estimates.

The U.S. Delmarva Peninsula offers a prime example of farm-wetland overlap. Its both a migratory stopover and a wintering ground along the North American flyway on the nations Mid-Atlantic coast. Its also the site of a$4.4 billion poultry industry that raised 600 million chickens in 2023. H5N1 has hit there and across the globe. In Cambodia, for example, farmers that raise their ducks and geese in wetlands have also seen outbreaks.

The virus is now spreading among cows, infecting at least171 herds in 13 U.S. states. It thrives in udder cells, and RNA from H5N1 has been found in milk.

Another serious concern: H5N1 has not petered out between spring and fall migrations, like avian flu normally does. Its now endemic in Europe and North America. When that happened, Walzer says, people began worrying that its not going to go away anymore.

It has flared for four years straight now, with wild birds currently carriers, reservoir hosts and victims of the virus.

H5N1 isnt new. In 1996,a goose in Chinas Guangdong province may have been patient zerofor the current strain, which spread among the flock and passed to wild birds. The virus then morphed into asevere respiratory disease that infected 18 people and killed six in Hong Kong. That outbreak ended after 1.5 million chickens were slaughtered.

Next came a viral chatter phase. Viruses dont just break through species barriers. As they change, they make periodic forays into other species, sometimes over years. In most cases, these ventures are unsuccessful. Unless a virus can enter cells and replicate, it circulates harmlessly.

Flu virusesmutate rapidlyas they acquire genes from other viruses: mixing, matching, reassorting and adapting, says Colin Ross Parrish, a virologist at Cornell Universitys College of Veterinary Medicine. Each genetic mutation creates a new building block for evolution: Genetic sequences are cellular instructions. They help a virus evade immunity in a host, determine how it causes infection, how it spreads and much more.

Avian influenzaseight-section genomeoffers numerous opportunities to reassort its genetics, not unlike a Las Vegas slot machine and in 2003, it hit a viral jackpot. Avian flu mutated to successfully spill back from poultry into wild birds,launching the current panzootic.

Fast forward to 2020 when H5N1 appeared in its current form in European birds and then successfully infiltrated new species, including mammals. It quickly spread to Africa and the Middle East, as it was carried long distances along migratory flyways. Humans helped byselling and shipping infected poultryacross national borders.

The virus crossed the Atlantic, reaching U.S. and Canadian shores in late 2021. Soon,mallards and swans were dying in the U.S. Midwest, bald eagles died nationwide,seals perished in Maine, as did bobcats in Wisconsin and raccoons in Washington and Michigan, to name just a few of the many losses.

The virus then aggressively invaded South America, targeting birds and sea mammals.Genetic studies on dead seabirds, a dolphin and a sea lionin Peru shed light on H5N1s movement and adaptations. Researchers discovered that in the U.S., the Eurasian strain added genes; in this form, it expanded its repertoire of hosts and raged like wildfire through large seal and sea lion colonies.

H5N1 finally reached both poles. Outbreaks continue to arise nearly everywhere.

Proximity is a big factor in how viruses spread, as the world learned during the COVID pandemic. Sharing a home or gathering in large groups poses a huge H5N1 risk, says Amandine Gamble, an infectious disease ecology expert at Cornell Universitys College of Veterinary Medicine. To understand where birds go and how they spread H5N1, she is collecting genetic material from various species in the Falkland Islands and outfitting them with tracking devices to follow their movements.

Regardless of the location, the virus triggers a systemic infection in birds. They may become lethargic, sneezing, coughing, gasping for air or experiencing intestinal issues. The virus also invades the brain. Sick birds may become disoriented, uncoordinated, stumbling, swimming or walking in circles, trembling or jerking their necks before keeling over dead. Some suddenly die without showing any sign of illness.Survivors may pass the virus to others.

Mammals experience many of the same symptomsas birds, but postmortems have also revealed pneumonia and bleeding in the heart, liver and other organs. Autopsies of 55 mammals showed that the most commonly afflicted part of the brain was the frontal lobe, which explains the movement and cognitive symptoms.

The genie is out of the bottle, says Waltzer. He emphasizes that the length of the outbreak, as well as the amount of the virus in the environment, is unprecedented. The sheer global distribution of this virus, he notes, is underestimated everywhere as well as the breadth of ecosystems that are being impacted.

Researchers are deeply concerned by the effects of this red-alert virus: High pathogenicity H5N1 is a real, tangible threat to wildlife, of a magnitude and scale never seen before, says Marcela Uhart, who heads the Latin American program at the University of California Davis One Health Institute.

On a United Nations situation update map, swaths of the world seem untouched, but that is likely because some regions have little or no monitoring for avian influenza, Walzer notes. For example, experts suspect there is vast underreporting in Africa. Many countries have slim resources, so pathogen hunters target the deadliest human threats: malaria. Ebola, Lassa fever and other infectious diseases.

Many pathogens, including avian influenza, arezoonotic: They jump between wildlife, livestock and humans. In recent decades, zoonotic diseases haveemerged and spread at accelerating rates. They are frequently fatal and have no cure.

As humanity encroaches on wild areas, people, livestock and wildlife come into into unnatural proximity, exposing all to germs they have no immunity to like avian influenza and leave wild animals with ever-shrinking habitat. Add poaching for the illegal wildlife trade, bushmeat hunting, and rapidly changing climate, and its no surprise that many species are in serious danger of extinction.

H5N1 is the newest threat. The number of different species being infected is quite profound, says Emily Denstedt, a health program adviser with the Wildlife Conservation Society.

Wild birds are among the most affected animals. This is a major change: previous H5N1 strains primarily attacked poultry. At least485 bird species from 25 classifications have been infected, including puffins, pelicans peregrine falcons, owls, toucans, parrots, bald eagles, warblers, finches and many others.

However, seabirds are by far the hardest hit. H5N1 super-spreader events in the U.K. offer sobering examples of the carnage wrought by this virus, though theres no way to accurately count the casualties.

Nesting colonies are now notably emptier in many locations. In Scotland home to 60% of the worlds great skuas breeding numbers have plummetedby three-quarters since 2021. Some 16,000 gannets died and the population in Wales dipped to precarious lows not seen since the 1960s. Rangers discovered more than660 dead Arctic tern chicks in England.

During the spring of 2022 in Africa,thousands of birds perished, particularly along the East Atlantic Flyway migration route in Senegal and The Gambia.Later that year, South Africa lost at least 28 African penguins a tragedy for these endangered birds.

In the U.S., the virus struck Lake Michigans Caspian terns, killing 62%. In early 2023, pelicans littered Peruvian beaches; more than 40% of the population died. At least 20 critically endangered California condors perished in Arizona, endangering their perilous recovery from just 22 birds in 1987.

So far, seals and sea lions are the only mammals dying en masse. However, the sheer number of affected mammals is worrying, ranging from grizzly bears, lions, pika, cougars, cows and dolphins to domestic dogs and cats, racoons, foxes, sea otters and a zoo tiger.Six dead walruses were discovered in Svalbardin 2023, some 965 kilometers (600 miles) from the Arctic Circle.

Uhart explains the broader collateral damage: All species play a role in maintaining healthy ecosystems, and big losses reverberate throughout the entire community. She offers pinnipeds as an example. As top predators, seals, sea lions and walruses keep prey species in check. Without them, previously constrained species multiply, may expand their ranges and displace other animals.

We almost wiped out pinnipeds in the past, hunting them for their fur and their blubber, and they are only now recovering after years of protection, Uhart says. We cant let a disease put them at risk again.

There may be other, less obvious effects on wildlife. Birds that sicken and survive probably wont fledge young, Munster says, and birds that breed in large colonies may not thrive in smaller groups. Walzer notes that we humans and our monitoring systems are really bad at detecting these more subtle decreases in populations, And suddenly, theyre gone.

The ultimate extent of this global animal apocalypse will hinge on H5N1s vigor, endurance and adaptability and importantly, on preciselyhowit adapts.

Much depends on the ways species interact. Lifestyle impacts the dynamics of how [H5N1] spreads in animal populations, says Cornells Gamble. In close quarters, it passes between birds, but not all develop terrible disease. They may become silent spreaders.

Another important factor is how animals are exposed and where. H5N1 is a resilient organism: It replicates in the respiratory tracts of mammals and birds and in birds intestines. Animals can shed virus from infected cells after only six hours.

Its quite hardy and remains infectious in water.One study found that H5N1survived in bird fecesfor nearly a day in extreme heat (42 Celsius, 107 Fahrenheit), five days in balmy temperatures (24C, 75F) and for up to two months in the cold (4C, 39F). This strains resilience is still unknown.

Carnivores and scavengers can catch the virus by eating an infected bird carcass. But researchers have also confirmed that mammals now transmit the virus between themselves, in the wild, on farms and in zoos. It spread on amink fur farm in Spain(where tens of thousands lived in about 30 barns), among dairy cows in the U.S.,tigers in a Chinese zooand pinnipeds in Argentina. Scientists determined that the strain that killed elephant seals also infected terns which could spread it far and wide.

Quesada is deeply concerned about the coming breeding season in the Antarctic. Confirmation of the virus in elephant seals puts us on even higher alert, he says.

Risk to humans grows as the virus racks up an ever-longer list of mammal hosts. Fourteen people have been diagnosed this year in the U.S.; all worked with cattle or chickens. So far, theres no evidence that the virus can pass directly between humans. However, the World Health Organization (WHO) has cautioned public health officials to get ready for a potential spillover. Alert levels will jump if H5N1 becomes airborne, if it can be sneezed out and carried via aerosols or respiratory droplets, Uhart says.

A key question remains: As individuals develop immunity, will the virus fizzle out? And if so, when?

Predictions for wildlife arent good. In places where H5N1 has already invaded, Uhart says, it will take years, maybe decades or more, for some wild species to recover. In those locations, she says she believes it will likely remain, continue to adapt and evolve into new strains. She expects recurring deadly waves and for some species that are currently endangered, just one outbreak may mean extinction.

Munster likens this panzootic to the SARS pandemic but in wildlife, with no preemptive, therapeutic or prophylactic countermeasures, like social distancing, masking, vaccines and antivirals.

One strategy, vaccinating poultry against avian flu, could stop or limit the current H5N1 evolutionary pool, Walzer says.

For decades,experts have been waving a red flag, trying to gain traction for aOne Health strategy to prevent future pandemics. Its a holistic approach, inclusive of human, wildlife, livestock and ecosystem health. Importantly, it incorporates disease risk into decision-making. A One Health approachshifts the onus on officials to prevent diseasesbeforethey jump between species, rather than the current model reacting once a crisis hits. Studies show this to be themost effective and economicalpandemic strategy.

In December 2021, amid COVIDs mass human mortalities, the WHO and representatives from 194 nations agreed to negotiate a pandemic treaty. But countries have not yet reached an agreement, missing a May deadline to deliver the document at the 77thWorld Health Assembly.A recent editorialstated that negotiators are nowhere close to adopting text that will truly prevent consequential pathogen spillovers from wildlife.

With massive industrial livestock operations located within migratory flyways, We could have seen [this panzootic] coming, but our ability to actually intervene on a legislative and political level is not there unfortunately, Munster says. And [wildlife] is definitely paying the price.

Meanwhile, viral chatter continues to surge, invisible and unabated between domestic and wild species.

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How is bird flu affecting animal populations? - Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance

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